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INC., and A L L A N K R U C K E N -
BERG, G A R Y M A R G E T T S , dba 
K M D E S I G N , 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is an action by property owners against a 
building contractor and designers for breaches of con-
tract, with counterclaims that the property owners had 
breached the contracts. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This action was tried to court without a jury. I t 
dismissed the property owners' action and entered judg-
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ment for the contractor in the amount of $1,577.73, to-
gether with attorney's fees of $1,182.00; and in favor 
of the designers for $500.00; plus interest and costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and re-
mand to the district court with direction to dismiss the 
counterclaims of the defendants and enter judgment 
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Exquisite 
Home Builders, Inc., in the amount of $4,303.72, to-
gether with an attorney's fee of $2,257.00, interest and 
costs; or to make findings with respect to the damages 
and attorney's fees to which appellants are entitled; or 
to grant a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
In the spring of 1971, Dr. and Mrs. Quagliana 
(plaintiffs and appellants) wanted to have a home 
built in Salt Lake City, utilizing plans previously used 
by Mrs. Quagliana's father (It. 164). Some changes 
were desired in the plans that they had, and they con-
tacted defendant K M Design (It. 1965), a partnership 
engaged in designing homes and apartments (It. 332). 
The partners in K M Design are defendants Gary 
Margetts and Allan Kruckenberg (It. 142, 126). 
An oral agreement was entered into by the Quag-
lianas and K M Design under which K M agreed to 
prepare modified plans and specifications (It. 334). 
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to the other terms 
of the contract, but the court found that the Quaglianas 
were to pay $1,000.00 for preparation of the plans and 
specifications, and that K M did not agree to supervise 
construction (R. 11, 65). 
During the conversations with Gary Margetts of 
K M , the Quaglianas made it clear that they wanted 
a home in the Oak Hills area, with a view of the city 
from the rear window (R. 168, 346). At that time 
they did not own a building lot, and began looking for 
one upon which the house would fit and provide the 
desired view (R. 168). 
During the Quaglianas' meetings with Margetts, 
he recommended some general contractors to build the 
home, among whom was defendant Exquisite Home 
Builders, Inc. (R. 167). 
The Quaglianas contacted Philip Marstella, an 
employee and representative of Exquisite Home Build-
ers (R. 167). Marstella was also a real estate broker 
and showed the Quaglianas property he thought might 
be suitable for the home (R. 279). Dr. Quagliana him-
self drove through the Oak Hills area and spotted a 
potential lot on Sherwood Drive (R. 168). At his re-
quest Marstella and Margetts went to look at the lot, 
and both advised him that the lot was suitable, and that 
the home would fit on the lot properly (R. 168, 346). 
Margetts said there would be a view (R. 346). The 
Quaglianas thereupon negotiated for and purchased 
3 
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the lot (R. 170). K M prepared a plot plan showing 
the location of the house on the lot (R. 170, 346). 
On or about October 7, 1971, a building contract 
was entered into by Marstella as agent for Exquisite 
Homes, and by the Quaglianas (Ex. 2-P). The con-
tract contained the following provisions material to the 
issues in this case: 
1. SCOPE O F W O R K : Contractor agrees 
to provide all the labor and materials and do all 
things necessary for the proper construction and 
completion of the dwelling house and the other 
improvements for the Owner upon the building 
site above described in strict accordance with this 
contract, the plans of specifications hereunto at-
tached and made a part hereof and identified by 
the signature of the parties hereto and in strict 
compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances 
and other governmental regulations affecting 
such construction. 
4. T I M E O F C O M P L E T I O N : The con-
tractor agrees the work hereunder shall com-
mence within 10 days after the notice that the 
mortgage covering the building site, given by 
the Owner to the Lender, has been recorded, and 
funds equal to the contract price have been de-
posited with the Lender in Construction Trust 
Fund Account No as provided in Section 
3 hereof, time being of the essence, and con-
tractor agrees to complete the construction of 
the dwelling house and improvements according 
to the plans and specifications, all applicable 
laws, ordinances and other government regula-
4 
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tions applicable thereto, as well as in a manner 
satisfactory to the Owner and the Lender, with-
in 180 days from the date of commencement. 
# # # 
8. P E R M I T S A N D S U R V E Y S : * * * 
Contractor shall, at his own cost and expense, 
provide the building permit. All other permits 
necessary for the construction of said dwelling 
house and improvements, including permits for 
sewer, water and other public utility connections 
shall be paid by the * * * Contractor. 
The cost of the original inspections and sur-
veys for the staking of the foundation shall be 
borne and paid by the Contractor. 
The cost of re-inspections as required shall be 
paid by the Contractor. 
The location of the building and improve-
ments upon the above-described building site 
shall be made by the Contractor, and in making 
said location, he shall comply with all zoning 
ordinances and regulations and all building re-
strictions and protective covenants governing 
said real property, 
* * * 
17. LENDER'S COURTESY SERVICE: 
As a matter of courtesy and favor, the Lender 
has supplied the Owner and Contractor with this 
suggested form of agreement. The parties here-
to declare that it was entirely optional with them 
to use said form and that they voluntarily ad-
opted and completed same. * * * (Emphasis 
added). 
5 
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The contract was on a form provided by Pruden-
tial. Marstella had used the form previously and was 
familiar with is contents (R. 297). 
Building restrictions had been recorded for the 
subdivision in which the property was located (Ex. 10-
P ) . They included the following provisions: 
9. S E T BACKS: No dwelling house or other 
structure to be constructed or situated on any of 
said lots created except in conformity with the 
"set back" lines as established in each instance 
by the Architectural Supervising Committee and 
in conformity with any additional "set back" 
lines which may be fixed by the undersigned, its 
successors and assigns, in contract or deeds to 
any or all of the lots created on said property. 
* * * 
14. I M P R O V E M E N T S : 
(b) Before the Architectural Supervising 
Committee may approve any plans for construc-
tion work of any kind on the premises, the lot 
owner or purchaser must submit the said com-
mittee an accurate plot plan showing the exact 
location of all buildings to be built on the lot. 
No construction of any kind or nature on any 
of the lots shall be commenced until either side-
walk or curb grade has been established. 
(c) A P P R O V A L O F P L A N S : No struc-
tures * * * shall be constructed upon any of the 
6 
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said lots without the written approval as to loca-
tion, height and design thereof first having been 
obtained from the Architectural Supervising 
Committee. Before construction work of any 
kind is started, the plans of the exterior design 
of any building to be constructed on any of the 
said lots shall first be submitted to the Architec-
tural Supervising Committee for their approval, 
and said plans shall show the four exterior eleva-
tions of said building, together with the floor 
plan plotted on a map of said lot and any addi-
tional details of the house construction the Archi-
tectural Supervising Committee may require. 
•* # # 
The set back established for the Quaglianas' Sher-
wood Drive property was 30 feet (R. 241). 
After the contract had been entered into, Mar-
stella went to Salt Lake City for a building permit 
(R. 258), and submitted the plans and specifications 
and plot plan. The plot plan showed a 30-foot set back 
on one street and a 20-foot set back on Sherwood Drive 
(R. 282). Before issuing the building permit, the city's 
representative struck out the words "20 feet" and in-
serted the word "average", meaning the average set 
back for houses located on the same side of Sherwood 
Drive. The average set back for such houses was 30 
feet (R. 214-215, 298, 228). ^ 
Exquisite thereupon hired an engineering com-
pany to stake out lines for the excavation for the home. 
Marstella made no effort to determine the average set 
7 
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back and directed the engineer to stake the lines exact-
ly as shown on the original plot plan (R. 282, 300). 
Exquisite proceeded to excavate the lines staked by 
the engineering company. 
At about the time the excavation was completed, 
Dr. Quagliana visited the property and discovered that 
the home was so located that there would be no view 
of the valley (R. 172). Marstella testified that it was 
fairly obvious at that time that the home would face 
directly onto the back of the other house, and "would 
look up into the front hill on the northeast part of the 
valley" (R. 283). 
Marstella and Dr. Quagliana agreed that the house 
could be rotated at an angle so that it would face the 
valley (R. 172). I t was Dr. Quagliana's desire to shift 
the house as far as possible and still meet the required 
side yard and rear yard set backs, Marstella said (R. 
283). The set back in the front yard (Sherwood Drive) 
was not lessened, but was increased except for the 
corner, which was the axis for the rotation (R. 284, 
299). 
Marstella then had a new plot plan prepared in 
which the house had been shifted to provide the view 
that the Quaglianas had wanted in the first place (R. 
284). The new plot plan, like the old one, showed a 
set back of 20 feet on Sherwood Drive; again the city 
changed it to "average" (R. 314); and again Marstella 
told his engineers to stake the excavation with a 20-foot 
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set back (R. 315). No effort was made to determine 
what the average set back was (R. 315). The footings 
and foundations were placed with a 20-foot set back on 
Sherwood Drive instead of the 30-foot set back re-
quired by the city regulations and the notation on the 
plot plan by the city. 
Dr. Quagliana was informed that the plans and 
specifications had not been submitted to the Architec-
tural Supervising Committee for the subdivision, and 
he told Marstella approval should be obtained (R. 175-
176). There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether 
this conversation was before or after the concrete was 
poured, but it is clear that it was at about that time. 
The concrete was poured on December 7 (R. 301), and 
sometime prior to December 10 Marstella had left the 
plans and specifications with the committee with a note 
asking that they be approved (Ex. 11-P). On Decem-
ber 10, the committee wrote a letter to Marstella (Ex. 
12-P) which contained the following: 
We note that you only have a 20-foot set back 
to the garage from the front property line. Our 
minimum is 30 feet. You show a 4/12 pitch roof 
which must be lowered to 3 ^ / 1 2 pitch. 
At about the same time, the exact date is not clear, 
the city inspectors placed a''"stop order" on the con-
struction (R. 217, 259). The court found that there 
was insufficient evidence to show the reason for the 
stop order (R. 19), but it is clear from the evidence 
that the building did not, in fact, conform to the set 
9 
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back requirements. Harry Hurley, Zoning Enforce-
ment Officer for Salt Lake City, testified that the set 
back was 10 feet short of that required by the average 
of houses in the block, and that notices were given to 
the contractor and the owner (R. 216). 
Exquisite stopped construction work about the 
time of receipt of the letter from the Architectural Sup-
ervising Committee and the stop order from Salt Lake 
City, and no further construction was done on the 
home (R. 260). 
Dr. Quagliana met with Glade Southam, presi-
dent of Exquisite, and Marstella concerning what 
might be done. Dr. Quagliana said he would go to the 
Architectural Supervising Committee to see if it would 
be possible to work out a solution with them (R. 317). 
Thereafter, Dr. Quagliana did meet with the commit-
tee, but was unable to obtain any relief. H e was told 
the only thing that could be done was to start over and 
try and meet requirements (R. 363). Mr. Muhlestein, 
a member of the committee, testified that the commit-
tee would not approve a set back of less than 30 feet 
(R. 243). Committee approval was never obtained 
(R. 261). 
On January 3, 1972, Dr. Quagliana called Pru-
dential Federal Savings and told them not to disburse 
any more funds to Exquisite without his approval (R. 
189). Negotiations commenced between Dr. Quagliana 
and Exquisite on January 4, 1972, concerning what 
might be done to remedy the situation (R. 178, 304, 
10 
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317), but no settlement was reached. Time went by, 
without any further construction work being done, and 
on March 9, 1972, Dr. Quagliana's counsel wrote to 
Exquisite terminating the company's right to proceed 
further with construction and telling them that the 
Quaglianas would look to them for damages for breach 
of contract (Ex. 16-DE). 
In December, 1972, the Quaglianas sold the lot on 
Sherwood Drive (R. 183), having theretofore pur-
chased a new home at another location (R. 182). An 
effort had been made to sell the home over many months 
and Dr. Quagliana had incurred expenses in selling it 
(R. 183, 264). H e ultimately was able to sell it to a 
contractor for speculation for the sum of $23,750.00 
(R. 264). 
The court concluded that Dr. Quagliana had 
breached his contract by refusing to let Exquisite Home 
Builders proceed further with construction and that 
Exquisite Home Builders was entitled to recover their 
unreimbursed costs. I t also found that Dr. Quagliana's 
agreement with K M was to pay $1,000.00 for the 
plans and specifications, that only $500.00 had been 
paid, and that therefore K M was entitled to recover 
the balance of $500.00 from Quaglianas. 
A R G U M E N T 
1
 ' 
The court should have found that the foundations 
and footings placed by Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 
11 
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violated the set back provisions of the Salt Lake City 
zoning ordinance and the restrictive covenants of the 
subdivision. 
Although requested to make a finding with respect 
to violation of the set back provisions of the ordinances 
and the building restrictions (R. 43) the court refused. 
This was a material issue in the case. Paragraph 4 of 
the complaint (R. 141) avers that the defendant Ex-
quisite Home Builders "excavated for and poured the 
foundation of the home in such a location on the plain-
tiffs' property that it would not comply with the build-
ing restrictions on the property." 
I t is the duty of a trial court to make the findings 
of fact with respect to all of the contested issues in a 
case. See Thomas v. Forrell, 82 Uah 535, 26 P.2d 328 
(1933) ; Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
76 Am. Jur. 2d, TnaZ,§1259. 
I t is not necessary to send the case back to the trial] 
court for a finding on this issue, however, because the 
facts with respect to violation of the set back restrictions 
were not seriously contested. 
Mr. Harry Hurley, the Zoning Enforcement Of-
ficer for Salt Lake City, testified (and was corrobor-
ated by the testimony of Marstella) that when the plot 
plan was submitted the 20-foot set back was stricken 
and the word "average" was written in. The set back 
as actually established by Exquisite Homes was 20 
12 
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feet, while the average set back for homes in that block 
was 30 feet. 
Mr. Grant Muhlestein, a member of the architec-
tural committee for St. Mary's Hills, Plat E , testified 
that the average set back, north side of Sherwood Drive, 
where the lot was located, was 30 feet, and that a 30-
foot set back was required by the committee. H e stated 
that the committee could not and would not have ap-
proved a 20-foot set back. 
Thus, the evidence required a finding that the 
foundation as built by Exquisite Home Builders was 
in violation of the zoning ordinances, the building per-
mit as approved by Salt Lake City, and the restrictive 
covenants that had been recorded for the subdivision. 
I I 
Other findings of fact made by the court are not 
supported by the evidence. 
The court's Finding No. 17 was that Dr. Quag-
liana had instructed Marstella to rotate the home and 
where to put it. Dr. Quagliana testified that he talked 
to Marstella about the problem and it was agreed be-
tween them that the house could be shifted to obtain a 
better view of the valley. Marstella testified that Dr. 
Quagliana did not expressly approve of the new plot 
plan, but after looking at it said it was better (R. 285). 
He also testified that he was "instructed" to shift the 
13 
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house as far as he could and still meet the side yard 
and rear yard requirements (It. 283). H e said the new 
drawing did not show the set back because it was 
greater than on the first drawing. 
The court found that Dr. Quagliana inspected the 
job site after re-staking and approved of the re-staking 
(Finding No. 23). The testimony of Mr. Marstella 
with respect to that matter was as follows (It. 284): 
Q : Did Dr. Quagliana inspect the staking prior 
to any excavation? 
A: I wouldn't say for sure whether he did. 
The court's Finding No. 31 is to the effect that 
Southam made various offers to the Quaglianas with 
respect to tearing out the foundations and footing, 
starting construction anew, buying the lot, and moving 
the garage to the opposite side of the house. The testi-
mony indicates that there was no firm offer made. Mar-
stella testified that no firm proposal had been made and 
that the conversation was to talk about possible solu-
tions to the problem in which Exquisite Homes found 
itself (It. 304). 
Southam testified that he felt it would be better 
to purchase the property and continue to build the house 
on its own account and that the company was trying 
to escape with the least possible cost (It. 322). 
The court's Finding No. 33 was improper, al-
though supported by some evidence. I n the Quaglianas' 
14 
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rebuttal case counsel offered evidence with respect to 
the conversations that occurred after the meeting of 
January 4, 1972, in an effort to show that no firm pro-
posal had been made. The following occurred in the 
examination of Dr. Quagliana (R. 364-365): 
Q: Can you tell us what, if any, contact you had 
with either Mr. Marstella or Mr. Southam sub-
sequent to January 4 ? 
A : Yes. 
MR. S A W A Y A : Excuse me, your honor. 
That is all matters which were part of the plain-
tiff's case in chief. I don't see that we really 
ought to have to listen to it again. 
T H E COURT: Well, what are you seeking 
to rebut here, Mr. Roe? 
MR. R O E : Well, there was a good deal of 
testimony, if the court please, about what kind 
of negotiations went on and what kind of com-
mitments were made in this case by Dr. Quag-
liana and by me after the meeting of January 4. 
T H E COURT: I really don't see what rele-
vancy the negotiations after the work was stop-
ped have with this lawsuit. I mean, they had a 
problem. I t wasn't solved. And what their in-
tentions were, their hopes were or their efforts 
to resolve it afterwards, do not impress me as 
being material or helpful here, because I can't 
see that the fact that they have negotiated in 
good faith or bad faith afterwards to try and 
correct the problem gives us any help with re-
spect to how we should resolve this question. 
15 
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MR. R O E : All right, I won't pursue it in 
that case, then. 
Notwithstanding the court's declaration that evi-
dence with respect to negotiations after January 4, 
1972, were not material to the issues in the case, it 
made a finding with respect to those matters when it 
found that Exquisite Home Builders after February 
23 advised plaintiff's counsel they were willing to tear 
out the foundation and start anew. 
I l l 
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., materially breach-
ed its contract when it located the home in such a man-
ner that it did not comply with the zoning ordinances 
or the restrictive covenants for the subdivision. 
In reaching its decision, the trial court reasoned 
that it was the obligation of plaintiff, rather than Ex-
quisite Home Builders, to obtain the initial approval 
from the Architectural Supervising Committee, that 
the approval was not obtained, that because of the 
failure to obtain it, the the committee sent the letter of 
December 10, 1972, proclaiming the violation, and that 
construction was stopped because of the letter. 
In so doing, the court ignored the terms of the 
contract, and lost sight of the breach claimed and proved 
by the Quaglianas. 
I t was not the failure to obtain approval that con-
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stituted the breach, but the building of the home in vio-
laion of the zoning ordinance and restrictive covenants. 
The contract required that the home be completed "in 
strict compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances 
and other governmental regulations affecting such con-
struction." I t also required the contractor to locate 
the building on the lot and "in making said location, 
[to] comply with all zoning ordinances and regulations 
and al building restrictions and protective covenants 
governing said real property." 
The contract also provided that the contractor was 
to perform the work "in strict accordance" with the 
contract and the plans and specifications, but the pro-
visions are not conflicting. The plans as approved by 
Salt Lake City did, in fact, provide for an "average" 
set back, and the permit issued by Salt Lake City pro-
vided for an "average" set back, not a 20-foot set back. 
Moreover, a reasonable construction of the contract 
is that the plans and specifications are to be followed, 
but in those instances in which they conflict with the 
requirements of law, ordinances, or restrictive coven-
ants, adjustment must be made. This is particularly 
true with respect to location of the house, the respons-
ibility for which is expressly placed upon the contractor. 
Any other construction would nullify parts of the 
contract and make it invalid. 
I t is fundamental that in interpreting contracts 
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the courts must, if possible, give effect to all provisions 
of the contract. See Restatement of Contracts, §235 (c) : 
A writing is interpreted as a whole and all 
writings forming part of the same transaction 
are interpreted together. 
And 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §259: 
I t is a fundamental rule of contract construc-
tion that the entire contract, and each and all of 
its parts and provisions, must be given meaning, 
and force and effect, if that can consistently and 
reasonably be done. An interpretation which 
gives reasonable meaning to all its provisions will 
be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the 
writing useless or inexplicable. So far as reason-
ably possible, effect will be given to all the lan-
guage and to every word, expression, phrase and 
clause of the agreement. No word or clause 
should be rejected as mere surplusage if the 
court can discover any reasonable purpose there-
of which can be gathered from the whole instru-
ment. A construction will not be given to one 
part of a contract which will annul another part, 
unless such a result is fairly inescapable. 
In McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah 239, 60 Pac. 1100 
(1900) this court said: 
In construing the contract, each of its pro-
visions must be considered in connection with 
the others, and, if possible, effect must be given 
to all. A construction which entirely neutralizes 
one provision should not be adopted if the con-
tract is susceptible of another, which gives effect 
to all of its provisions. 
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I t is also a generally accepted principle that an 
interpretation should be adopted which gives a lawful 
meaning to the contract, rather than an unlawful one. 
The rule as stated in Restatement of Contracts, 
§236(a), is as follows: 
An interpretation which gives a reasonable, 
lawful and effective meaning to all manifesta-
tions of intention is preferred to an interpreta-
tion which leaves a part of such manifestations 
unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect. 
The same rule is announced in somewhat different 
terms in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §254: 
I t is a general principle that where a contract 
is fairly open to two constructions, by one of 
which it would be lawful and the other unlawful, 
the former will be adopted. Thus, if a contract 
is capable of a construction which will make it 
valid, legal, effective, and enforceable, it will be 
given that construction if the contract is am-
biguous or uncertain. A construction which ren-
ders the contract valid is preferred to one which 
renders it invalid, and it will not be construed so 
as to be invalid unless that construction is re-
quired by the terms of the agreement in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances. 
The rule was adopted by this court in Schofield v. 
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 
39 P.2d 342 (1934), in which the court said : 
I t is elemental, in construing a contract, that 
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its purpose, its nature, and subject matter 
should be considered. A construction giving an 
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its pur-
pose will be adopted when it can reasonably be 
done, and between two possible constructions 
that will be adopted which establishes a valid 
contract. 
I t is not necessary to go beyond the plain language 
of the contract to see that Exquisite Home Builders 
had a legal duty to see that the horrte was located in 
such a manner that it did not conflict with zoning regu-
lations or restrictive covenants. The set back require-
ments for both the city zoning regulations and the re-
strictive covenants was the "average" set back of the 
other buildings on Sherwood Drive, on the same side 
of the street, and in the block in which the Quagliana 
home was being built. The average set back in the area 
was 30 feet, but the foundation was placed with a 20-
foot set back. This is a substantial and material breach 
of the contract. 
The fact that a Salt Lake City inspector had ap-
proved the footings does not change the legal obliga-
tions of Exquisite Home Builders under the contract. 
The contract was to comply with the regulations, not 
merely to obtain approval of an inspector. A similar 
question has been presented in connection with contracts 
requiring construction in compliance with Federal 
Housing Administration or Veterans Administration 
Housing standards. I t is consistently held that mere 
approval by an inspector does not control the question 
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of whether the structure meets the contract require-
ments. See Annotation, "Construction of clause in 
building contract that structure will comply with regu-
lations, plans, or standards of the Federal Housing 
Administration or the Veterans Administration," 67 
A.L.R.2d 1017 (1959). There the annotator says: 
Generally, a clause in a building contract that 
the structure will comply with the regulations, 
plans, or standards of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration or Veterans Administration has 
been construed to mean that the structure, when 
completed, will conform to such regulations, etc., 
and not that the approval of the structure by 
those agencies is conclusive on the question of 
compliance. 
Moreover, the decision to rotate the house did not 
affect the legal oblgiations of Exquisite Home Build-
ers, either by way of a new agreement or by way of 
waiver. 
I t was known to all the parties, Exquisite Home 
Builders, the Quaglianas, and K M Design, that be-
fore purchasing the lot on Sherwood Drive the Quag-
lianas were interested in a lot which would accommo-
date the particular house, and with a view of the valley. 
When the foundation was first excavated, Dr. Quag-
liana visted the site and observed that the window faced 
the mountain. Thereafter Dr. Quagliana and Mar-
stella discussed the possibility of rotating the house on 
its corner. Rotation was apparently discussed because 
of the fact that this would have to be done in order to 
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retain the original set back provision. There was no 
discussion about the front set back for the reason that 
it would not be affected. But Marstella himself testi-
fied that Dr. Quagliana was interested in shifting the 
house as much as possible within the requirements for 
side yard and rear yard set back requirements. 
The method by which the problem was approached 
contains no suggestion that Dr. Quagliana intended 
to proceed with the house in contravention of the zoning 
ordinances or the restrictive covenants. I t was legiti-
mate for him to assume that Exquisite Home Builders 
had properly established the front yard set back; and 
it must be assumed that the parties intended to have 
the remaining portions of the contract remain in effect. 
As stated in 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construc-
tion Contracts^ §4: 
When a building is in process of construction, 
and additions or alterations are made, the orig-
inal contract, unless it is so entirely abandoned 
that it is impossible to trace it and say to what 
part of the work it shall be applied, is held still 
to exist, and to be binding on the parties so far 
as it can be followed. The additions or altera-
tions, if the expense of the work is thereby in-
creased, may be the subject of a new contract, 
either express or implied, but they do not affect 
the original contract, which still remains in force. 
See also 17 A, C.J.S., Contracts, §395. 
In this case there is absolutely no evidence that the 
parties intended to affect the provision that the building 
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would be located in conformance with regulations and 
covenants. 
Neither is there any evidence showing an intention 
on the part of the Quaglianas to waive the provision 
requiring the contractor to properly locate the build-
ing. The case does not have the elements of waiver. In 
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 
308 (1936), the court set out the elements as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. 27 R.C.L. 904. To constitute a 
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and 
an intention to relinquish it. I t must be distinctly 
made, although it may be express or implied. 
See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, 
§158. 
Exquisite Home Builders was in default under the 
contract as of December 7, 1971, when they located the 
building contrary to the requirements of the zoning or-
dinance and the restrictive covenant. This being true, 
the Quaglianas were discharged from any further per-
formance under the contract and had a right to do what 
they did on January 3, 1972, i.e., tell Prudential Fed-
eral Savings not to make any more payments to Ex-
quisite Home Builders. 
In Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d 
464, 469 (1962), the court said: 
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* * * I t has been said that the party who com-
mits the first breach of contract cannot maintain 
an action against the other for a subsequent 
failure to perform. * * * 
In Scientific Packages v. Gwinn, 13 Colo. 233, 301 
P.2d 719 (1956), plaintiffs had sought to restrain de-
fendants from competing with them on the basis of a 
contract containing a non-competition agreement. The 
contract also provided, however, that the defendant and 
companies controlled by him, would be released from 
all liability under certain promissory notes guaranteed 
by him and another, and steps were to have been taken 
within 10 days to cause the guaranty to be cancelled 
and rescinded. At the time the action was brought, this 
had not been done, and the court denied injunctive 
relief to the plaintiff on the non-competition agree-
ment. The court said: 
We must conclude that plaintiffs' failure to 
release Gwinn from liability on the note held by 
the bank in accordance with Shapiro's promise 
was a substantial breach of the contract, which 
deprived plaintiffs of the right to demand per-
formance by Gwinn of the agreement not to op-
erate a competing business. The party who com-
mits the first substantial breach of a contract is 
also depirived of the right to complain of a sub-
sequent breach by the other party. 
This is the general rule. See Restatement of Con-
tracts, §§274,379: 
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§274: 
(1) I n promises for an agreed exchange, any 
material failure of performance by one par ty 
not justified by the conduct of the other dis-
charges the latter's duty to give the agreed ex-
change even though his promise is not in terms 
conditional. A n immaterial failure does not op-
erate as such discharge. 
(2) The rule of subsection (1) is applicable 
though the failure of performance is not a viola-
tion of legal duty. 
§379: 
A breach or non-performance of a promise by 
one par ty to a bilateral contract, so material as 
to justify a refusal of the other party to perform 
a contractual duty, discharges that duty. 
See also Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 
Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689, 693 (1956) ; and Fleming 
v. Fleming-Felt Co., 7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712, 716 
(1958). 
Exquisite Home Builders failed to locate the build-
ing in accordance with the contract; then it let a month 
pass without doing anything about it before D r . Quag-
liana stopped payments under the contract. Fur the r 
time passed, and while there were some settlement 
negotiations with respect to attempts to correct the 
problems created by Exquisite Home Builders, no set-
tlement agreement was entered into, and the contractor 
did nothing to go forward with the building of the 
home. The Quaglianas were completely justified, there-
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fore, when they notified Exquisite Home Builders that 
its right to proceed under the contract was terminated. 
Time was of the essence of the contract. Exquisite 
Home Builders had breached the contract on or before 
December 7, 1971, and more than three months had 
passed without any further construction work having 
been done on the home. The original contract provided 
for completion of the home within 180 days or by ap-
proximately April 7, 1972. Half of that period had 
been spent doing nothing, and it was apparent that it 
would be impossible to complete the home within the 
time specified, or within any extension to which the 
contractor might be entitled. 
IV 
KM Design materially breached its contract with 
the Quaglianas. 
All of the parties agreed that before the Quag-
liants purchased the lot on Sherwood Drive they wanted 
to be sure that the house would fit on the lot and would 
afford them a good view of the valley from the rear 
window. Although there was no written contract be-
tween the Quaglianas and K M Design, the conduct 
of the Quaglianas in having the plans and specifica-
tions drawn up, and in checking with the contractor 
and the designer before the purchase of the lot, makes 
it apparent that a material consideration of the Quag-
lianas in entering into the contract with K M Design 
was to not just obtain some plans and specifications, 
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but to obtain plans and specifications compatible with 
the lot they purchased and their desire for a view. 
I t was with the advice and approval of K M De-
sign and Exquisite Home Builders that the Quaglianas 
purchased the Sherwood Drive lot. They were assured 
by both that the house could properly be placed on the 
lot. K M Design was well aware of the desire for a 
view of the valley, and yet the plot plan prepared by 
K M Design was prepared in such a manner that the 
house did not face the valley. It faced the rear of other 
houses, and the mountain. 
Moreover, K M Design prepared a plot plan with 
a 20-foot set back despite the fact that zoning and re-
strictive covenants required a 30-foot set back. After it 
was determined that a 30-foot set back was required, 
Exquisite Home Builders attempted by overlays and 
plotting to determine whether the house could be built 
on the lot. I t determined that it was possible to build 
the house on the lot, but not in such a manner that it 
would afford a view of the valley to the Quaglianas. I t 
was testified to by Marstella that if the house were re-
located with a 30-foot set back, the view of the valley 
would be worse than it had been when Dr. Quagliana 
first looked at the site after the original excavation 
(R. 292). 
Certainly the designer had some obligation with re-
spect to the location of the home and carrying out the 
desires of his client with respect to a view. I t is ap-
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parent from the evidence that he did not fulfill that 
obligation and did not fulfill the obligation to properly 
locate the house on the property so that it would meet 
the requirements of the zoning ordinances and restric-
tive covenants. 
This being the case, K M Design first breached 
the contract, and was not entitled to recover the por-
tion of the purchase price they claim was unpaid. 
V 
The court erred in awarding to Exquisite Home 
Builders the unreimbursed costs it had put into the 
building. 
As pointed out under Point I I I , above, a party in 
default under a contract is not entitled to recover under 
the terms of the contract. Under some circumstances 
he is entitled to a remedy of restitution. 
Restatement of Contracts, §357, provides: 
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to 
perform his contract and is justified therein by 
the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-per-
formance of a condition, but the plaintiff has 
rendered a part performance under the contract 
that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plain-
tiff can get judgment except as stated in Sub-
secion (2), for the amount of such benefit in ex-
cess of the harm that he has caused to the de-
fendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding 
a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation, 
if 
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(a) The plaintiff's breach of non-preform-
ance is not willful and deliberate; or 
(b) The defendant, with knowledge that 
the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-perform-
ance of condition has occurred or will there-
after occur, assents to the rendition of the part 
performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or 
retains property received although its return 
in space is still not unreasonably difficult or 
injurious. 
(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit 
from the plaintiff's part performance is the 
amount by which he has been enriched as a re-
sult of such performance unless the facts are 
those stated in Subsection ( lb) , in which case it 
is the price fixed by the contract for such part 
performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable 
proportion of the total contract price. 
(The parties referred to in the Restatement should 
be reversed here, since we are dealing with the counter-
claim and considering the right of a defendant to re-
cover for its part performance.) 
If the Exquisite has a right to any offset or re-
covery because of its part performance, it must be 
under the provisions of paragraph (la) relating to a 
non-willful or non-deliberate breach, in which case the 
measure of recovery is the amount by which the Quag-
lianas were enriched as a result of such performance. 
In order for a contractor to recover for the value 
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of benefit conferred, he must show that a benefit has 
been conferred. 
In Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) , §1475, it is 
recognized that the modern tendancy among courts is 
to allow some recovery under certain circumstances, 
even though the contractor has not substantially per-
formed. Referring to the doctrine of substantial per-
formance, the writer says: 
But the courts have generally abandoned it, 
and not hold that where a builder has supplied 
work and labor for the erection or repair of a 
house under lump sum contract, but has departed 
from the terms of the contract, he is entitled to 
recover for his services and materials, unless: 
(1) The work that he has done has been of no 
benefit to the owner; 
(2) The work he has done is entirely different 
from the work which he has contracted to do; or 
(3) He has abandoned the work and left it 
unfinished. 
In the instant case there was no proof that the 
work was of any benefit of the owner. There was 
proof that the work done was entirely different from 
that which Exquisite contracted to do, and that Ex-
quisite had left the work unfinished. 
If Exquisite Home Builders is relying upon a 
claim that they have conferred a benefit upon the prop-
erty, they have the burden of proving the benefit. The 
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question of the right to recover on the principle of resti-
tution was considered at some length in Golob v. George 
S. May International Company, 2 Wash. A p p . 499, 
468 P.2d 707 (1970), in which the court said: 
The alternate theory of restitution available 
to an aggrieved par ty for a substantial breach 
of contract permits recovery upon equitable 
principles of payments made under the contract. 
Restitution in such a case proceeds on the theory 
of disaffirmance of the contract and when there 
is no literal restitution, approximates the relief 
of rescission, that is, being restored to one's or-
iginal position as if no contract had been entered 
into. If the defaulting par ty has part ly per-
formed and his breach is not willful and if the 
part performance has enriched the aggrieved 
party, the defaulting party may recover or set-
off the monetary value of his par t performance 
against the aggrieved party 's claim. This is so 
because in equity and good conscience it would 
be improper for the aggrieved par ty to retain the 
benefits of the defaulting party 's par t perform-
ance without paying for it—the aggrieved par ty 
otherwise would be unjustly enriched. If, how-
ever, the part performance is worthless or if the 
fact of benefit or the monetary value of such 
par t performance is not proved, there is neither 
a showing of enrichment nor a showing that the 
retention of benefits of such services is unjust. 
The burden of showing unjust enrichment and 
its value is upon the claimant defaulting party. 
There is no evidence in this case that the perform-
ance by Exquisite Home Builders was a benefit to the 
Quaglianas. The only thing upon which the court might 
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have based such a finding of benefit is set out in find-
ings numbers 39 and 40 (R. 21): 
39. The plaintiffs sold Lot 8 to Gale G. Smith 
on December 13, 1972, for the sum of $23,-
750.00; and that the said Gale G. Smith util-
ized the existing excavation and nearly all of the 
existing foundation walls in the construction of 
a home. 
40. That plaintiffs purchased said Lot 8 on 
May 4, 1971, for the sum of $20,485.00. 
This finding is not sufficient to support a deter-
mination that the Quaglianas were benefited by the 
performance of Exquisite Home Builders. There is no 
evidence as to the negotiations or circumstances under 
which the Quaglianas were able to obtain the lot for 
the price they did, or the negotiations or circumstances 
under which Gale G. Smith was willing to pay $23,-
750.00 for the lot. There was no testimony by anyone 
that the value of the lot was increased by virtue of the 
"improvements" placed upon it by Exquisite Home 
Builders. The only evidence is that a purchase was 
made on May 4, 1971, for one price and that the prop-
erty was sold some 19 months later for a higher price. 
There was no evidence as to the market value of the 
property at either time, or as to the factors that may 
have increased the price or as to whether the lot would 
have brought a higher value with the foundation than 
without it. Defendant Exquisite Home Builders has 
thus failed in its burden of proving that the labor and 
material furnished by it enhanced the value of the prop-
erty or benefited the Quaglianas. 
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Moreover, where a recovery is allowed for the 
value of the benefit conferred, it is usually on the theory 
that the circumstances must be such as to give an option 
to the property owner to take or not to take the benefit 
of the work done. As stated by the court in Sumpter 
v. Hedges, 1 Q.B. 673 (1898) : 
* * * Where, as in the case of work done on 
land, the circumstances are such as to give the 
defendant no option whether he will take the 
benefit of the work or not, then one must look 
to other facts than the mere taking of the benefit 
of the work in order to ground the inference of 
anew contract. 
VI 
The Quaglianas are entitled to recover the dam-
ages they suffered as a result of the breach of contract 
by Exquisite Home Builders, together with a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
Inasmuch as the trial court ruled in favor of the 
defendants, and held that the Quaglianas were the ones 
guilty of the breach of contract, it made no finding 
with respect to the damages suffered by the Quaglianas. 
Robert Roof, a loan officer for Prudential Fed-
eral Savings, testified that the lending institution had 
charged the Quaglianas a service fee at the inception 
of $1,500.00; a credit report and appraisal fee of 
$45.25; title insurance policy $235.00; and fire insur-
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ance $189.00, which were deducted from the loan pro-
ceeds. 
Prudential Federal Savings charged interest in the 
amount of $47.48. It made disbursements of $614.19 
to Cook Lumber; $442.18 to A & L Concrete for foot-
ings; $498.92 to Exquisite Homes for permits and 
footings; $396.00 for excavation; and $118.50 for stak-
ing the lot. In addition, the Quaglianas paid one $5.00 
charge to Prudential for inspection fees. Of these 
charges Prudential Federal Savings refunded $900.00 
of the service charge and the $47.98 interest (R. 99-
100). 
Dr. Quagliana had other expenses. H e had to hire 
someone to remove weeds from the property, a cost of 
$25.00; on another occasion in 1972 he had weeds re-
moved at a cost of $60.00. He paid Salt Lake County 
taxes of $280.00 in 1972. He incurred costs with the 
Salt Lake Tribune of $59.68 in trying to sell the prop-
erty. He had a liability insurance policy which cost 
$195.00, necessitated by the condition of the premises 
as left by Exquisite Home Builders. He paid K M 
Design $500.00 and he paid $25.00 for copying blue-
prints; and $15.00 for posting signs on the property 
in an attempt to sell it. His damages totaled $4,303.72, 
or $4,803.72 if the K M judgment is not reversed. 
The contract provided for a reasonable attorney's 
efe for the prevailing party. 
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Mr. R. Mont McDowell testified as to the method 
of record keeping and expressed his opinion that a rea-
sonable attorney's fee for time spent up until the trial 
was $1,697.00, and $280.00 for each day of trial. There 
were two trial days. In addition, other time was spent 
in connection with motions for amendment of the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, and motion for a 
new trial, indicating that the court should have allowed 
an attorney's fee of not less than $2,257.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The Quaglianas, in an effort to have a home built 
to their liking, relied upon the skill and competence of 
two professionals, a designer and a contractor. Both 
of them ignored the zoning ordinances and building re-
strictions and, as a consequence, the Quaglianas ob-
tained the beginnings of a home they couldn't use. 
Under the trial court's ruling, however, they had 
to pay for the work even though it was not performed 
in accordance with their contracts. 
They behaved as reasonably as anyone could be 
expected to behave under the circumstances, but rea-
sonableness was not regarded by the trial court as a 
virtue. 
The trial court misconceived the law, the facts and 
the issues, and entered judgment against the Quag-
lianas on legally unjustifiable grounds. The court 
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found no breach of contract on the part of the con-
tractor even though it located the home in contraven-
tion of building restrictions; it found no breach by the 
designers even though they had as part of their con-
tract approved a lot that wasn't suitable and had used 
a 20-foot set back instead of the required 30-foot set 
back. 
The court held that the Quaglianas had breached 
the contract even though their obligation had been dis-
charged by defendants' prior breaches. 
The judgment should be reversed and remanded 
to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the 
Quaglianas against Exquisite Home Builders in the 
amount of $4,303.72, plus $2,257.00 attorney's fees, in-
terest and costs (or determination of the amounts) and 
dismissal of the counterclaims. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
ROE A N D F O W L E R 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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